

WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR AND SYMPOSIUM

CHAPTER 2

THE GUERRILLAS

Chapter I outlined the background of Rhodesian society - both Black and White - from the distant past until 1965. This chapter will examine the Black participants in greater detail. First, the major political personalities of the guerrillas will be introduced. Phase I of the war, which took place during the late 1960s, will be described from the point of view of the insurgents. The FROLIZI splinter group will be introduced, followed by Phase II of the war. Finally, small unit tactics and formations used by ZAPU and ZANU will be considered.

Michael Raeburn, in his book "We are Everywhere", describes the three stages of the insurgency in Rhodesia.¹ The first period, from the 1920s until the late 1950s was characterized by efforts to achieve equal opportunity and higher wages for the Black population. During the second period, from the late 1950s to 1965, the emphasis was placed on gaining majority rule by political means. These two periods have been described in Chapter I. The final period, the armed struggle, began with the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Ian Smith in 1965. This chapter will examine the organization and leadership of the guerrilla - or, as some call it, liberation - forces.

In other revolutionary movements, like those which took place in Cuba and China, it is relatively easy to describe these forces, since they were homogeneous and dominated by one strong leader. Such was not the case in Rhodesia. As was described in Chapter I, the original split between ZAPU and ZANU occurred at least partially due to the lack of a strong leader who could unite the various bickering factions.

Black Political Leaders

The best way to begin this chapter is to examine briefly the background of the four principal political leaders who vied with each other for power. Joshua Nkomo, a member of the Ndebele tribe, was born in 1917 and educated in Rhodesia and South Africa. He received his BA in economics and sociology from the University of South Africa. Nkomo began labour union work in 1951 and was involved in the founding of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1957, the National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1960 and ZAPU in 1961. The best known international figure of the guerrilla movement of the 60's and 70's, he was nevertheless criticized by the more militant factions for the amount of time he spent outside the country and was described by some as an "Uncle Tom".² Although not as anxious to compromise as Muzorewa and Sithole (in his later years), he was certainly easier to deal with than Mugabe. The following two quotes reveal something of his personality and ideology. When asked about the allegiance of the guerrillas he replied, "They cannot go around waving guns and saying they are in charge. They are not fighting to be the bosses. It is not everybody that must shoot."³ A second statement was made during the peace talks of September, 1976. "I do not want people to say, 'Oh, my, why are they taking so long?' It has taken us 85 years to get where we are today. Therefore we can afford to take a few more days or a few more weeks to work out the future of our country."⁴

A second early leader among the guerrillas was Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, who was the early leader of the ZANU faction which broke away from ZAPU in 1963. The former mission teacher did his theological work at Newton Theological College, Andover, Massachusetts.⁵ Early in his revolutionary career he was perceived as somewhat more militant than Nkomo. After Mugabe displaced him from the leadership of ZANU, Sithole began to create a new image of himself as a moderate in order to increase his appeal as a compromise candidate for majority rule. In this effort he was competing with Muzorewa

for the middle ground.

Bishop Abel Muzorewa, born in 1925, was a high ranking official in Rhodesia's Methodist Church.⁶ Like Sithole, he received his theological training in the United States. Muzorewa first stepped into prominence in 1971 as leader of the African National Council, formed as a moderate alternative to ZAPU and ZANU. Supported by the black members of his large church, he was seen as the chief hope by Rhodesian Whites as their situation became more tenuous. Muzorewa lacked the strength and charisma of Nkomo and Mugabe, but most important, he needed an army to back him in the final struggle for power.

Robert Gabriel Mugabe, who rose to a dominant position within the guerrilla ranks, was the most ideological of the revolutionaries. He was born in 1924, and received his early education at a Roman Catholic mission. His scholastic achievements are impressive. In 1951, he received a BA from the University of South Africa before beginning a career as a teacher, Ghana and Zambia.⁷ While in detention from 1964 to 1974, he completed by correspondence three degrees from the University of London, a BA, BS and LLB. Mugabe was not shy about stating his beliefs and affiliations. He once said to a correspondent of the New York Times, "I don't like the fact that I have certain fundamental principles behind my political philosophy which stem from Marxist-Leninist thinking."⁸

Sentiments of this nature and a willingness to resort to ruthless tactics to achieve his ends make Mugabe the most feared of the guerrilla leaders. Robin Moore, in Rhodesia,⁹ alleges that some of his hatred of Whites was due to a long unarrested case of syphilis that became cancerous and necessitated surgical removal of his testicles while in detention in 1972. The authors were unable to verify this allegation by any other source.

Phase I of the Guerrilla War (1964)

In Chapter I, the banning of ZAPU and ZANU in 1964 and the jailing of the principal leaders were described. When the two groups moved to Zambia, Herbert Chitepo became leader of ZANU and organized a military wing of the party, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). Not to be outdone, James Chikerema of ZAPU formed the Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). Although they decided that the time had come to initiate guerrilla warfare, like the four principal leaders just described, neither Chitepo nor Chikerema had any formal military training.¹⁰

Unfortunately, the displacement of ZAPU and ZANU to Zambia did not result in elimination of their quarrels.

ZANU and ZAPU in exile began to compete with each other for legitimacy in the eyes of Zimbabweans at home. They began to undermine each other, each claiming to be fighting in Zimbabwe and inflicting damage on the Smith forces. To fight militarily in Zimbabwe both ZAPU and ZANU needed money and military hardware, for which they depended on the Organisation of African Unity and friendly states. But to put pressure on the donors, ZANU and ZAPU had to appear to be fighting. Thus, fighting was sometimes initiated by both ZANU and ZAPU not necessarily for revolutionary effectiveness but for the sake of appearing to be involved in liberation activity.¹¹

During the period 1965-1968 ZAPU and ZANU conducted a series of uncoordinated and rather amateurish raids across the border from Zambia. Two of the problems faced by the guerrillas have already been described - lack of coordination between the two major factions, and lack of a real plan of how to conduct a campaign. A third problem is the terrain. After crossing the Tsetse-fly and crocodile infested Zambezi river valley, the infiltrators were faced with relatively open, rolling countryside which exposed them to observation by Rhodesian forces.

Yet another obstacle faced by the guerrillas was lack of standardized training. Michael Raeburn

describes this problem after interviewing the members of a ZAPU platoon.

The men who made up the platoon had all received military training. But they had been taught in different countries. Joseph and a young man called Tami Ndhlovu had gone to Cuba; Fireworks and two others had been in Algeria; the Commander and three others went to Moscow; the young boy of sixteen had trained in Lusaka, and Lovemore had been in Cuba. In all these countries the men had been taught how to shoot, but they all had varying concepts of how the war should be waged, and they all had different political attitudes.¹²

It is important to understand that although the guerrillas for the most part grew up in the bush and were used to the terrain, they were certainly not supermen. If they operated in large groups of 75-100 men, they were easy for the Rhodesian forces to spot. On the other hand, extremely small forces were incapable of creating any significant results. Their constant nemesis during these years was the efficient Rhodesian police force. Supporters of the Smith government attributed this efficiency to the loyalty of the Black Rhodesians and their desire to compromise the murderous terrorists. The leadership of ZAPU and ZANU, conversely, charged the Rhodesian forces with brutality, intimidation and torture of the populace.

There was probably truth to both charges. In most campaigns of this sort, the peasants in the field simply want to be left alone. Terrorised by guerrillas at night and intimidated by police during daylight hours, they can only hope to survive until one side or the other wins. In any case, this emphasizes one of the primary weaknesses of the efforts of ZAPU and ZANU during the early years of their campaign. They did not make any significant effort to prepare the population for liberation. Details of the fighting will be described in Chapter IV; however, suffice to say, guerrilla actions were limited to ambushes and attacks on isolated farms. Reaction by Rhodesian forces was usually swift and fatal. By 1968 the guerrilla campaign had come to a standstill.

At the end of Phase I of the guerrilla offensive, it is useful to look at the relative strengths and weaknesses of the guerrillas, and why this initial campaign failed.

Advantages

1. The Black population was much larger than the European stock. In theory, this would force the White forces to spread themselves over the country and expose them to defeat in detail. This advantage in numbers was negated in many ways by the Rhodesian forces. Their efforts to recruit Blacks into the armed forces, superior mobility and use of intelligence will be discussed in Chapters III and IV. Further, since ZAPU and ZANU were operating only from Zambia, it was relatively easy for the Rhodesians to concentrate their forces.
2. A long-term conflict would hurt the Rhodesian economy. An economy based primarily on farming and light industry, beset with sanctions by the rest of the world, would have difficulty supporting a large-scale military force.
3. To be effective, the guerrillas did not have to hold terrain - they simply had to challenge government control by hit-and-run tactics, ambushes and intimidation.
4. The guerrillas had considerably more foreign support from which to draw. This support took many forms. Moral encouragement and sanctuary were provided by other Black nations in Africa, such as Zambia, Botswana, Ghana and Tanzania. A major addition to this alliance occurred when Mozambique gained its independence from Portugal in 1975. Training and weapons were provided by the major communist powers - ZAPU supported by the Soviet Union, ZANU by the Peoples' Republic of China. Finally, monetary and psychological support was furnished by various liberal organizations such as the World Council of Churches.

Disadvantages

1. The first major disadvantage, already described, was the political split between ZAPU and ZANU which prevented them from coordinating the insurgency effort. Although this did not prevent ultimate victory, it prolonged the war, caused many additional guerrilla casualties, and contributed to many of the difficulties remaining today in Zimbabwe.
2. Lack of logistic support was another major obstacle to be overcome by ZAPU and ZANU. Lack of modern communication equipment and sufficient medical supplies made life difficult for groups infiltrating from Zambia. Food generally had to be obtained from sympathetic areas in the Tribal Trust Lands. The Rhodesian police forces carefully monitored the tribes' food supplies, making it difficult to supply any substantial guerrilla force.
3. Terrain and climate on the Rhodesian-Zambian border was difficult. The Zambezi river is swift and inhabited by unfriendly crocodiles. Disease-carrying Tsetse flies infested the valley. After climbing out of the Zambezi lowlands, the guerrillas had to cross wide expanses of open land to reach areas where they could hide.
4. As mentioned earlier, groups had to be small enough to avoid detection, yet large enough to accomplish military objectives.
5. Early in the war the major guerrilla leaders were primarily teachers or ministers - not trained soldiers. Most of these leaders were incarcerated for 10 years, beginning in 1964.
6. Although most of the guerrilla soldiers received basic military training, it was from a variety of sources and non-standard. Russian training emphasized more conventional military aspects, while the PRC concentrated on political indoctrination.
7. Finally, the guerrillas were faced with an extremely effective Rhodesian intelligence network, and superior mobility through the use of motor vehicles and aircraft.

Strategically, the authors feel that the major reason that the early offensive failed was that the rural population within Rhodesia was not properly prepared before the armed struggle began. Tactically, the guerrillas were not properly trained, were weak in numbers and acted too predictably.

Frolizi Splinter Group

Beginning in 1968, the fighting ebbed while the guerrillas attempted to regroup. Unfortunately for them, another chaotic split soon developed within their ranks. Kapungu, in "Rhodesia: The Struggle for Freedom", provides the following description of events as they unfolded:

In early 1970 the desire for propaganda to boost the ZAPU image precipitated a crisis that fragmented not only ZAPU but also ZANU. James Chikerema, the vice-president of ZAPU and the leader of the party in exile, without consulting his colleagues invited a team from the British television programme "Panorama" to film operations of ZAPU guerrilla fighters. Chikerema's colleagues were taken by surprise when the program appeared on British television stations. It is said that the Zambian government was also angered by the fact that it had not been consulted, since some of the scenes that appeared were filmed on Zambian soil.¹³

D.B.C. M'Gabe attributes the split in ZAPU to tribal differences. He states that Chikerema and most of the enlisted men were from northern Rhodesia and Shona, while many of the mid-level officers were Ndebele.¹⁴ Chikerema was attempting to use these tribal differences to establish a splinter faction. In order to further legitimize his position, he made overtures to members of ZANU and formed a new party, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) in October 1971. Further "encouragement"

for this union was furnished by the Zambian government, which was growing tired of the violence between the two major groups of guerrillas.

President Kaunda ordered ZAPU and ZANU to settle their differences or get out of the country (August 1971). His government underlined its displeasure in a cold-blooded way by deporting 129 recalcitrant ZAPU men to Rhodesia, where they immediately fell into the hands of the police. Some received death sentences in Rhodesian courts.¹⁵

The major leaders of FROLIZI were as follows:

James Chikerema - Acting President of ZAPU

George Nyandoro - General Secretary of ZAPU

Nathan Shamuyarira - Financial Secretary of ZAPU

F. Kashiji - Chief Political Organizer of ZANU

S.G. Parerewa - Welfare and Labour Secretary of ZANU

Although FROLIZI claimed to have produced a common front which would carry the struggle to Rhodesia, large portions of ZAPU and ZANU refused to join the new organization. With limited funds available, and lack of support from the two major guerrilla organizations, its existence seemed rather precarious. There were two major reasons that it survived: 1) The leadership of Chikerema, and 2) the failure of ZAPU and ZANU to conduct effective military campaigns against the government of Rhodesia.¹⁶

In any case, FROLIZI received permission from President Kaunda to establish a training camp in eastern Zambia near the border with Rhodesia and Mozambique. About 70 men underwent military training there. What manner of men were these guerrillas who followed Chikerema? The following background of Amon Sibanda is probably typical:

He had left Rhodesia in 1963 to look for work in Zambia. In 1968 the Zambian government apparently made it compulsory for all expatriate Rhodesians to join one of the exiled Rhodesian parties in Zambia. Sibanda chose ZAPU. In less than a month, with the active help of men from the ruling Zambian political party, ZAPU pressed him into service as a full time military recruit. They first quartered him at a camp fifteen miles from Lusaka and then sent him by road to Tanzania for training. Together with 160 other recruits he learned how to handle weapons. He had instruction in judo and bayonet charges, and learned the use of mortars and bazookas. From Tanzania he went on to Bulgaria for five months artillery training. He came back to Tanzania in 1970 and moved from there to Zambia. His experiences had not yet converted him to ZAPU's cause, and he promptly deserted their camp, going to stay with an uncle who lived nearby in a rural district. One day he went to town to sell some cabbage; a colleague from Tanzania days spotted him in the street and informed the police. Two detectives arrested Sibanda and took him to Lusaka police headquarters, where a Zambian police superintendent struck him and called him a coward. The police returned him to his camp. In 1971 he transferred to FROLIZI.¹⁷

Sibanda was hardly the dedicated freedom fighter!

In early 1973, FROLIZI launched a raid into Rhodesia to attempt to establish their credibility. The two six-man groups caused some alarm by conducting several robberies and murders, but were quickly and efficiently rounded up by the Rhodesian authorities. Shortly thereafter the ZANU leaders who had joined FROLIZI resigned in a dispute with Chikerema and Nyandoro. For the next three years, FROLIZI remained in the background until merging with ZAPU and ZANU to form the Patriotic Front in 1976.

Phase II of the Guerrilla War

At the same time that the FROLIZI splinter group formed in Zambian exile, another attempt was made within Rhodesia itself to unite ZAPU and ZANU. The African National Council (ANC) was created in October 1971, and Bishop Abel Muzorewa was chosen as its first leader. Since ZAPU, ZANU and FROLIZI had "staked out" the revolutionary left, and moved outside the country, Muzorewa decided to occupy the centre and organize opposition within the country. Leaders of the guerrilla forces, however, were not enthusiastic about either Muzorewa's goals or his leadership.

The next significant political development was the release from detention after ten years of the incarcerated leaders of the guerrilla movement.

When the nationalist leaders were released from Rhodesian prisons in December 1974, they were persuaded by the presidents of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana to merge their rival movements, of which ZAPU and ZANU were the biggest, under the umbrella of Bishop Muzorewa's African National Council. The union was short-lived. Mr. Nkomo, the ZAPU leader, wanted to talk with the Rhodesian government. Mr. Sithole, the ZANU leader, thought talks were hopeless and wanted to prepare for war.¹⁸

To add to the confusion, Robert Mugabe now emerged to claim that he was the true leader of ZANU and claimed that all dealings should be through him. After concluding an agreement with guerrilla forces fighting the Portuguese in Mozambique, he moved his followers to that country. It is interesting to note that Mugabe, alone among the top leaders, lived with his men in the field.¹⁹ At this time there were an estimated 400 guerrillas inside Rhodesia and 5,500 outside the country.²⁰ The majority of the latter followed Mugabe, who gained some significant military advantages when Mozambique gained independence in June, 1975.

In early 1975, the guerrilla forces continued their divisive bickering. After secret talks were held in Salisbury between Ian Smith from the Rhodesian government, and Muzorewa, Sithole and Nkomo, Sithole was arrested for plotting to kill his political rivals. Two weeks later, Herbert Chitepo, one of the major ZAPU leaders, was killed by a landmine in Lusaka, Zambia. ZAPU blamed ZANU for the murder, while ZANU blamed the Rhodesian government. No-one has been able to conclusively prove either theory.

To further complicate the political picture, Sithole, after being released from arrest, formed an external wing of the ANC called the Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ZLC). At the same time Nkomo and Muzorewa parted ways, with the latter forming yet another wing of the ANC outside Rhodesia. Once again the actors changed roles. Nkomo, attempting to appear as a moderate, opened negotiations with Ian Smith. Shortly thereafter, Sithole returned to Rhodesia after two years in exile, became a "born-again" moderate and renounced terrorism. Three months later, Muzorewa returned to Rhodesia and changed the title of his faction to the United African National Council. Only the implacable Mugabe remained outside the country denouncing the rest as collaborators. Not to be outdone, however, he also formed a new party called the Zimbabwe Reformed African National Council.

Although this constant shifting of party names and posturing by leaders sounds a bit like a comic opera, the guerrillas were increasing their attacks against both White settlers and Black Rhodesians who were not considered sufficiently fervent in their revolutionary beliefs. Judging by the amount of intelligence gained from captured guerrillas, it is reasonably certain that the police used beatings and torture to gain information. The guerrillas, on the other hand, were far from bashful about committing atrocities to gain their ends. Several quotes serve to illustrate the plight of the rural Blacks.

Whatever his sympathies, a Black villager in Belingwe is in a cruel predicament: he faces severe punishment from either the guerrillas or the government if he fails to cooperate. He can be sentenced to death for recruiting or encouraging guerrillas; if he reports them, on the other hand, they may well kill

him. One villager, known to be a government informer, was pinned by guerrillas to a bed of straw; his young son was forced to set it on fire.²¹

A second incident is related as follows:

One tribesman suspected of informing on the guerrillas had his nose, ears and lips cut off - and his wife was forced to cook the bits of flesh.²²

1976 continued with little real progress on the diplomatic front. Nkomo, Mugabe and a few elements from FROLIZI formed the Patriotic Front, theoretically uniting ZAPU and ZANU once more. Those two leaders were invited by the British government to London, along with Muzorewa, for talks. Sithole demanded to be included, claiming that he, not Mugabe, headed ZANU. The talks broke up when a date for majority rule in Rhodesia could not be agreed upon. A significant setback for Muzorewa and Sithole occurred in January 1977 when the presidents of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia agreed to back the Patriotic Front. Although later in 1977 Ian Smith reached an agreement with Sithole, Muzorewa and Chirau (a hereditary Chief) to have them join the government in an attempt to pre-empt the more militant leaders of the Patriotic Front, this effort was doomed to failure, since these leaders were now seen as collaborators by their people.

Before examining the final political settlements, this chapter will examine the organization of the guerrilla forces of ZANU and ZAPU, ZANLA and ZIPRA. On the following pages are organization charts and maps of areas of responsibility for the two armies. By late 1977, estimates of guerrilla strength varied from 9,500 to 15,000 in various periodicals of that time. All sources agreed that the ZANLA forces outnumbered those of ZIPRA about two to one. During this phase of the insurgency, the guerrillas modified their strategy and began a grass roots programme to indoctrinate the peasant population of Rhodesia. Their logistics problems from the earlier years were significantly eased with Mozambique added to the revolutionary fold. As they gained momentum militarily, the population was far more ready to assist them.

Small Unit Tactics and Formations

The authors have attempted to determine specific information on small unit tactics and formations which were utilised by guerrilla forces. The task was made difficult by the fact that any materials published by members of, or sympathizers with, ZAPU and ZANU, have been oriented toward the political aspects of the struggle. We have obtained an unpublished manuscript entitled "ZANLA's War in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia: A look at Strategy and Tactics", written by Captain Paul Melshen, USMCR. Captain Melshen, who currently lives in London, observed the war in Rhodesia during 1979. He and others were hired by farmers in remote areas to assist in providing security. Descriptions of guerrilla tactics are drawn from this manuscript.

The largest tactical unit of ZANLA was normally the company, consisting of 90 to 100 men. The company was subdivided into three platoons of equal size, which were further organized into two 15-man sticks. For infiltration from Mozambique into eastern Rhodesia, the company would be broken into these smaller units which would reassemble at a designated time and place across the border to receive final instructions.

Most movement through the bush by the sticks was done in column formation for ease of control as follows:

Insert diagram

The interesting aspect of this formation is the position of the political commissar near the rear of the column to aid with straggler control. The riflemen carried AK-47s or SKS rifles. Battle formation was achieved by simply shifting the axis 90 degrees and flanking to the left or right.

One of the most common types of action initiated by the guerrilla was the night attack on an isolated farm or outpost. Since most villages and homesteads were protected by a combination of barbed wire, electric fence and anti-personnel mines, the guerrillas usually approached no closer than 200 to 300 metres from their objective. Documented evidence indicates that they preferred to attack between 1800 and 2200 hours during the last quarter of the moon. This tactic enabled them to move into position under cover of darkness and then withdraw rapidly when visibility was slightly better. In order to elude the highly skilled trackers of the Rhodesian Security Forces, they would use the "bombshell" method - that is, the members would split up and each move by a different route to the predetermined rendezvous point.

In addition to this form of night attack, the guerrillas often conducted ambushes on civilian or military vehicles if they could be isolated from strong military forces. ZANU was also quite active in employing land mines along the many dirt roads which run throughout the country. Some interesting and unique Rhodesian countermeasures will be explored in Chapter III.

Using these tactics, the guerrillas stepped up their pressure against the government of Ian Smith. Smith agreed to meet secretly in Zambia with Joshua Nkomo in August 1978, the first time he had singled out the ZAPU leader over Mugabe. When the ZAPU guerrillas shot down their first Air Rhodesia airliner with a SAM-7 on 4 September, 1978, Ian Smith broke off the talks. Twenty-eight people were killed in the crash, and ten of the eighteen survivors were massacred by ZAPU forces.²³

In the spring of 1979, Smith backed Bishop Muzorewa in an election, hoping to install a moderate Black who would allow the Whites to retain de facto control of the country. As one would suspect, Nkomo and Mugabe ridiculed the election results. When the leaders of the Black nations of Africa, as well as the Carter administration, refused to recognise Muzorewa, his end was in sight. Warfare continued sporadically throughout the summer, with ZAPU and ZANU attacking each other as often as the Rhodesian forces. Finally, in the fall of 1979, the leaders of Mozambique, Zambia, Angola, Tanzania and Botswana put pressure on Nkomo and Mugabe to negotiate with the Rhodesian government.²⁴ From September to December the difficult negotiations were carried out. Thousands of members of ZANLA and ZIPRA returned to designated camps under British supervision.

Intimidation and charges of malfeasance characterized the elections in early March, 1980. Two assassination attempts on Mugabe did not improve his disposition. Most White Rhodesians prayed for a victory by Muzorewa which, they hoped, would prevent a bloodbath. They were stunned by the overwhelming victory of Marxist Mugabe, whose party captured 57 of 80 contested seats.²⁵ In retrospect, his victory should not have been surprising. Not only was Mugabe a member of the Shona tribe which comprised 80% of the population, he was also the leader of the largest guerrilla army and showed the least inclination to negotiate with the government of Ian Smith.

Since becoming Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, however, Mugabe has shown himself to be a pragmatic statesman.

Zimbabwe's White farmers have profited from high produce prices and expanded markets since Mugabe was swept into power in 1980. Many of the White farmers have warmly supported him, although by their conservative nature they oppose his socialist policies.²⁶

Unfortunately, Mugabe has not been as successful assimilating the members of ZAPU into the country's government. Many whites and Blacks have become victims of the continuing violence in the southwestern part of the country where the Ndebele are dominant. This is the area where two young American tourists recently disappeared.

An interesting epilogue to the final Black victory occurred last year. Edgar Z. Tekere, a member of Mugabe's cabinet, was convicted - to many people's surprise - of murdering a White farm manager. He was then freed under a law enacted by the Ian Smith government which shielded ministers from criminal

charges if they acted in good faith to suppress terrorism.

The following chart has been constructed by the authors to assist the reader in navigating through the stormy seas of the Black parties in Rhodesia.

[1](#) Michael Raeburn, "We are Everywhere", (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 27.

[2](#) Richard Hall, "Black Victory in Rhodesia: How Bloody will it be?", New York Times, 11 July, 1976, Sect. 6, p. 14.

[3](#) Hall, p. 14.

[4](#) Michael T. Kauffman, "Turning Point seen ahead for Rhodesia by a Black Leader," New York Times, 26 Sept., 1976, p. 1.

[5](#) L.H. Gann, "Prospects for White Resistance," Africa Report, Sept-Oct 1977, p. 13.

[6](#) Hall, p. 14.

[7](#) Robin Moore, "Rhodesia", (New York: Condor, 1977), p. 34.

[8](#) Gregory Jaynes, "Rhodesia's Resolute Leader", New York Times, 5 March 1980, p. 8

[9](#) Moore, p. 46.

[10](#) Leonard T. Kapungu, "Rhodesia, the Struggle for Freedom", (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1974), p. 135.

[11](#) Kapungu, The Struggle, p. 135.

[12](#) Raeburn, Everywhere, p. 107.

[13](#) Kapungu, "The Struggle", p. 138.

[14](#) Davis B.C. M'Gabe, "The Nationalist Movement of D'Zimbabwe," in "Drums of War" (see note 20, Chapter I) p. 55.

[15](#) Tony Kirk, "Politics and Violence in Rhodesia", African Affairs, January 1975, p. 5.

[16](#) Kirk, "Politics", p. 6

[17](#) Kirk, "Politics", pp. 9-10.

[18](#) "ZIPA Up" in "The Economist", 3 July 1976, p. 53.

[19](#) Kaufmann, "Turning Point", p. 1.

[20](#) Gann, "Prospects", p. 10.

[21](#) "Caught in the Middle", Time, 12 Sept 1977, p. 25.

[22](#) Richard Steele, "White Africa at Bay", Newsweek, 7 June, 1976, p. 35.

[23](#) "Rhodesian Airliner shot down by Guerrillas," New York Times, 5 Sept. 1978, p. 1

[24](#) "We are going Home," Time, 31 December 1979, pp. 32-33.

[25](#) John F. Burns, "Mugabe reassures Whites in Rhodesia," New York Times, 5 March 1980, p. 1.

[26](#) Joy Ross, "Zimbabwean Whites assail Breakdown of Law and Order," Washington Post, 19 Sept 1982, p. A26.

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