

WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR AND SYMPOSIUM

CHAPTER 4

THE CONFLICT

The Rhodesian War has been classified as an unconventional conflict. Our examination of the Rhodesian Security Forces demonstrated that the Army was structured in a conventional fashion, but task-organized to counter a guerrilla insurgency. The majority of combat occurred at a low level of intensity: small groups of Rhodesian soldiers making contact with the insurgents, a brief episode of combat and an extended period of tracking. Throughout the war there were very few large-scale battles at the level to which Americans became accustomed from 1965-1970 in the Republic of Vietnam.

In order to review this research in a fashion which is both interesting and instructive, we will present a synopsis of operational commitments of the Rhodesian Security Forces in a chronological order between 1975-1979. The operations we have chosen will provide a basis for a historical development of the conflict, and demonstrate the manner in which a small and well-organized force was able to adapt to the pressure of an increasingly powerful insurgent army.

JUNE 1975: OPERATION NEWTON

By 1975 the black nationalist cause had begun to draw increasing numbers of volunteers from the Tribal Trust Lands. These enlistees were sent to Mozambique for very rudimentary training and returned to Rhodesia as members of an insurgent unit. The majority of guerrillas were ill trained and without technical expertise. Those men who had demonstrated good potential and possessed some degree of education were sent to Tanzania from Mozambique for additional training. Consequently, in the initial stages of the war the most inept and poorly trained fighters constituted the majority of the Patriotic Front's combat force. The problem was compounded by the total lack of radio communication assets between guerrilla forces in Rhodesia and headquarter elements in Mozambique. In order to disseminate information and orders, the insurgents relied upon messengers and couriers. In 1975, Rhodesian Intelligence began to unravel the intricacies of the nationalists' system of communications. Each insurgent operational sector had a contactman who received information from the Military High Command in Mozambique. He was responsible for the dissemination of these directives on a monthly basis. As a result, the guerrillas became prisoners of their own system. If the regularity of the meetings were altered or the rendezvous points changed, the various insurgent units would lose contact, and have to return to Mozambique in order to re-establish a base connection.

In June, the Security Forces in the Northern HURRICANE Operational Area were prepared to exploit this weakness. The final element of information required was to determine the approximate date of the assembly of guerrilla forces. The Intelligence Branch had ascertained the identity of the contact man and his village CODE NAME-VIETNAM. The date was established by using a simple graph. The periods of guerrilla activity were plotted on a monthly basis over the span of a year. Two points stood out. Each month had a seven day period in which insurgent activity diminished, then followed by a sharp increase. In addition, each period coincided with the full moon and first quarter of the lunar cycle. It was felt that the insurgents preferred to decrease their activity during this period because the Security Forces became more active in the conduct of night operations. This intelligence indicated that another major gathering of guerrilla forces in the HURRICANE Operational Area would occur between 18-25 June. Elements of the Selous Scouts established observation points throughout the area, and the SAS conducted reconnaissance patrols. Twelve infantry companies, two engineer squadrons, a mortar platoon, and sixteen helicopters were staged and prepared to strike.

On 24 June, intelligence and spot reports verified the presence of a large number of insurgents

assembling in the area around VIETNAM. A cordon area was established consisting of approximately 40 square kilometers. Throughout the next 24 hours, as the cordon was tightened, 33 guerrillas were killed and 6 captured. The results were good, and the Rhodesian forces had learned a valuable lesson. The cordon area had been too large, and the majority of nationalists had escaped through gaps in the perimeter.¹

OPERATION LONG JOHN: JUNE 1976

The Rhodesian Security Forces had been conducting raids and operations into Mozambique since 1972, but as the war intensified these operations became almost routine. Although a state of war did not exist between Rhodesia and Mozambique, the latter was the firmest supporter of the ZANLA guerrilla faction. On 9 May 1976 the New York Times reported:

An estimated 1000 guerrillas are inside Rhodesia. Another 1400 are thought to be encamped across the border (in Mozambique) and anywhere from 5,000 to 10,000 more training in Mozambique and Tanzania.

As a result of the size of the nationalist element staging and training inside Mozambique, the Salisbury government authorized its forces to begin clandestine operations inside the border regions.

Operation LONG JOHN serves as an excellent example of the type of mission mounted against guerrilla forces in Mozambique. This operation was an attack on a guerrilla transit camp at Mapai and staging post identified as Chicualacuala. The plan involved the first use of a tactic that would become known as the "Flying-Column Attack". The transit camp was located approximately 60 kilometers inside Mozambique. It was necessary to introduce a reconnaissance force into the area in order to determine the exact location and size of the camp. It was confirmed that approximately 90 ZANLA insurgents were staged at Chicualacuala, and a large ZANLA arsenal was located at Mapai. The confirmation of an arsenal" meant that the attacking force would come in contact with FRELIMO soldiers of Mozambique. The new government of Mozambique was willing to provide sanctuary for the Patriotic Front Insurgents, but they would not allow them to travel throughout the countryside in armed groups. Their weapons were maintained and guarded by FRELIMO soldiers, and issued immediately prior to their infiltration into Rhodesia.

The plan involved a mechanized assault across the border utilizing armored cars, trucks, and several buses. The attack would bypass Chicualacuala, and strike directly at Mapai. The former would be eliminated on the return trip. On the morning of 25 June, the assault force crossed the border, and proceeded to the Chicualacuala railway staging area where it was observed by FRELIMO sentries. The column had the markings of ZANLA insurgents, and was not challenged. The force reached Jorge Do Limpopo by the evening of the 25th, and established a perimeter. At 0600, 26 June, the formation reached Mapai. A battle commenced in which several Rhodesians were killed, but a large quantity of arms were captured, to include a number of Soviet RPG-7 rockets.

On the return trip, the column attacked the staging camp, and killed or wounded 37 ZANLA Insurgents. This operation was an absolute success, and the "Flying Column" became the standard tactic for cross-border operations.²

This war reveals an impressive point concerning the limited size and nature of this conflict. The attacking force of Operation LONG JOHN consisted of 55 Rhodesian soldiers, and approximately 8 vehicles. The only air support provided for the attacking force was a helicopter medevac for the wounded at Mapai. The Rhodesians favored the use of its fixed wing assets on an "on-call-strip alert" basis. The close air support aircraft were only used in an emergency situation. Helicopter vertical assault tactics were very seldom used because the insurgents had a SAM capability, and the Rhodesians' heliborne assets were virtually irreplaceable because of the international sanctions.

OPERATION ELAND: August 1976

Throughout the summer of 1976, Rhodesia became aware of a major ZANLA staging and training camp located in Mozambique and identified as the Nyadzonya Base. This camp appeared to be the main insurgent and logistics base for operations conducted in the THRASHER operational area. Both aerial reconnaissance and captured guerrillas had confirmed that the camp contained a large hospital, and approximately 5,000 ZANLA personnel.

This constituted the largest center of insurgent activity discovered to this point in the war. As a result, a combined force was organized to include members of the RLI, RAC, SAS, Selous Scouts, and members of selected Territorial Units. The success of the "Flying-Column Attack" during the Mapai raid served as the basis for the tactics devised for a strike against the ZANLA forces at Nyadzonya. Once again, air support would be provided for serious medevacs on the objectives, and close air support would be available in the event of a dire emergency. The planning included a table model of the camp and its surroundings. Captured insurgents provided information concerning the defenses, positions of the armories, hospital, living quarters, the daily routine, and a general outline of the escape drills of the ZANLA insurgents. The "Flying-Column" consisted of 14 vehicles and 85 men. The vehicles were of two types: 10 UNIMOGS and 4 FERRET Armored Cars. The transports were armed with a wide assortment of weapons: 20mm aircraft cannons, medium and light machine guns, and a captured Soviet 12.7 mm heavy machine gun. The men were dressed in captured Mozambique FRELIMO uniforms with their distinctive caps (the European members of the force wore black ski-masks). The vehicles were painted using the FRELIMO colors, and Rhodesian Intelligence had provided genuine FRELIMO registration numbers for the vehicle license plates.

The detailed planning depended upon achieving total surprise in conjunction with both FRELIMO and ZANLA demonstrated inability to mount a rapid response to a decisive strike. The route to the objective utilized a secondary road which SAS Reconnaissance Units had found to be guarded and patrolled only during the hours of daylight. Once the objective was reached, it would be necessary to destroy the Pungwe River Bridge in order to isolate the area, and allow the column to move north from the objective without fear of pursuit from a numerically superior force equipped with better mechanized assets.

The Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization had established that an "all hands" formation took place each morning at 0800. This muster was attended by everyone with the exception of cooks, patients, and hospital staff. The assault force set 0810 as the time of attack. At 0005 on August 9, the Rhodesian Force crossed the Mozambique border. The FRELIMO guard detachment was absent as had been anticipated. At 0200, the convoy entered the town of Vila De Manica, and passed without incident while returning the salutes of several FRELIMO sentries. At 0330, the column established a bivouac several kilometers past the Pungwe Bridge. At 0700, the force moved toward Nyadzonya without incident. By 0825, the column reached the entrance to the camp. There were six ZANLA soldiers on duty. They should have been accompanied by two additional FRELIMO soldiers, but they were absent. The ZANLA were never allowed to forget that they were guests in Mozambique, and were reluctant to interfere with a FRELIMO convoy. The Rhodesian Force was allowed to enter the camp.³

Upon entry, the vehicles moved to pre-established positions surrounding the camp. As the lead vehicle moved forward-

the parade ground suddenly opened up in front of them, and there were few men in the column who did not gasp in amazement at the sight which greeted them... there could never have been enough rehearsals... never enough briefings and mental preparations to have readied them for the sight which met their eyes. A short distance away from them as their UNIMOGS formed into line just off the parade ground, was the largest single concentration of terrorists mustered which would ever be seen by any members of the Rhodesian Security Forces, throughout the entire war. (one soldier simply commented), I

just hope we don't run out of ammunition.... (approximately 4000 insurgents) were milling around the parade ground in a state of flux.⁴

When all the vehicles were in place, a Rhodesian soldier announced over the vehicle loudspeaker in SHONA, the native language of the ZANLA, "Zimbabwe tatona"...we have taken Zimbabwe. The crowd immediately began cheering and singing, and ran toward the vehicle on the edge of the parade ground.

Soon 4000 yelling and singing terrorists were jam-packed around the vehicles and more were streaming in from all corners of the camp."⁵

Then the Rhodesians began firing with their machine guns and rifles. An 81 mm mortar section dismounted, and fired into the crowd. The firing continued at a maximum sustained rate until all movement in the kill zone had ceased. There was some return fire, and five Rhodesian soldiers received minor gunshot wounds. Two Ferret armored cars had been positioned to block the escape route. These vehicles killed an additional 150 ZANLA before the retreating crowd broke toward the river. In their attempt to cross the Pungwe tributary, another 200 insurgents were drowned. At this point, the Security Forces had been in the camp approximately 45 minutes. The task force had captured 14 prisoners, and a good deal of documentation. As the main force withdrew from the camp, the Pungwe Bridge was destroyed.

The Rhodesians turned north along their planned route of withdrawal. Along the road, the column entered a village with approximately 100 FRELIMO soldiers. As the convoy passed through the hamlet, the lead vehicle made a wrong turn, and the force drove onto a football field without another exit. A FRELIMO officer approached the lead vehicle and offered directions. As the column began to withdraw, two of the vehicles stalled. The FRELIMO officer became suspicious, and noticed several European soldiers. A brief firefight ensued, and the attacking force required the assistance of a section of Hawker Hunter jets in order to fight their way to the Rhodesian border.⁶

On 22 August, 1976, the New York Times reported the attack:

This was seen as the beginning of a campaign to strike out at the guerrillas before they entered Rhodesia in small units, spreading thin the limited reserves of the Rhodesian army. The international condemnation of that raid, and the private protests made by South Africa, which has feared the provoking of a wide-ranging racial war, prevented other strikes at encampments across the Mozambique border ...(in addition), South Africa withdrew 50 helicopter pilots who had been flying with the Rhodesian Air Force.⁷

Both the ZANLA and ZIPRA factions claimed that Nyadzonya had been a refugee camp. In May, 1976, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) had visited the camp, and verified its refugee status. After the attack, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the High Commissioner of UNHCR, issued a statement in Geneva.

I have no doubt that a settlement of Zimbabwean refugees which has been receiving United Nations' assistance was attacked, and that hundreds of refugees were killed and wounded. To be a refugee is in itself, a tragedy. That such large groups of refugees should have been made victims of indiscriminate bloodshed makes this incident particularly shocking and abominable. It escapes my understanding as to what those responsible thought they were accomplishing through such an atrocity.⁸

This appears to be convincing evidence that the Rhodesian Forces had attacked a refugee center. It is balanced by three facts. The Salisbury government claimed throughout the war that the inspection of refugee camps by UN officials was never impromptu, and that prior to these tours

the insurgents were removed, and their families with augmentation remained. In addition, it is interesting to note that upon Robert Mugabe's assumption of legitimate power in Zimbabwe, this incident was never mentioned, and there were no "war trials". The final fact remains the most conclusive. The official ZANLA Report, dated August 19, 1976, clearly indicates that Nyadzonya was an insurgent camp. It specifies that on August 9 there were 5250 personnel in the camp, of which 604 were "povo" or refugees. The ZANLA Report gives the casualty figure as 1028 killed, 309 wounded, and approximately 1000 missing. The report is exceptionally candid. The paragraph entitled ATTITUDE OF COMRADES offers the final synopsis:

It should be mentioned once again that the comrades have only one desire, to go for training. This desire more than strengthened after the massacre on the 9th instant. The attitude of the comrades towards the revolution is now much deeper than before. They are highly committed to the cause of the liberation of ZIMBABWE more than they ever were. Keeping them in bases often referred to as "Refugee Camps" keeps robbing them of their morale and their desire to concentrate seriously on revolutionary matters.⁹

OPERATION AZTEC: MAY/JUNE 1977

This operation is examined because it illustrates the impact of the international community's economic sanctions upon Salisbury's ability to wage war, and the manner in which Rhodesia compensated for this liability. In addition, the commander of the principle combat element was Captain John Murphy, Rhodesian Army. Captain Murphy was an American citizen who had served as a 1st Lieutenant with the U.S. Marine Corps' 1st Reconnaissance Battalion in the Republic of Vietnam in 1969.

He was released from active duty in 1971, and attended graduate school at the University of South Carolina. He was commissioned an officer in the Rhodesian Army in 1975, and served until 1979. He was commissioned in the South African Defense Force (SADF) in 1980, and died in a parachuting accident with the SADF in 1981.

In May of 1977, it became apparent that the Rhodesian Security Forces did not possess the depth required to stop or reduce the infiltration of insurgent forces from Mozambique into the southeastern REPULSE operational area. It was decided that a major attack against ZANLA guerrillas in Mozambique was required.¹⁰ Before the operation was completed in June of 1977, a total of 700 Rhodesian soldiers would have crossed the border, and participated in action against ZANLA insurgents and FRELIMO forces.

The operation commenced on the border at Gona-Re-Zhou. The 2nd Battalion, Rhodesia Regiment, pushed approximately 10 kilometers into Mozambique to strike at a ZANLA staging camp in order to create a diversion. At the same time, a commando company from the Rhodesian Light Infantry would conduct a heliborne assault on a ZANLA installation at Rio while a second commando would conduct an airborne assault on a ZANLA base camp at Madulo Pan. The commando companies would secure strong points at these locations. Once this was accomplished, a "Flying-Column", under the operational control of Captain John MURPHY, would enter Mozambique and follow the rail line as far as Jorge Do Limpopo, destroying all ZANLA camps and installations along the route. Elements of the "Flying-Column" would also move west to Mapai to destroy ZANLA camps in the area. The Rhodesian Air Force would be used only in the event of an emergency. During Lt.Col. Daly's brief to Captain Murphy, he stated:

I made it crystal clear he could likely be in for a stickier time than he had ever dreamed possible while serving with his old outfit...the very fine U.S. Marine Corps in Vietnam. There would be nothing to parallel the instant and massive air support he would have had there if he got into difficulties. He would be almost completely on his own...there would be the sparing support, on call only, of two old Hawker Hunter fighter bombers...but he

would only be permitted them if his difficulties were in the extreme.¹¹

The principle reason for this reluctance to use air support, was not political. It was economic. Rhodesia lacked the foreign exchange required to buy ammunition and spare parts for the aircraft. They remained the government's most valuable asset, and would not be used until absolutely necessary.¹²

The "Flying-Column" for operation AZTEC consisted of 110 men, task organized into a combat element, supported by an organic 81mm mortar group/platoon. The unit was out-fitted in FRELIMO uniforms, and the trucks were painted in FRELIMO patterns. On May 28, the operation commenced. After heavy fighting, the commando units secured the strong points, and the column advanced to Jorge Do Limpopo. The town was rapidly overrun, and Murphy learned that the main ZANLA base had been moved to Mapai. The commando company at Madulo Pan was brought forward to secure Jorge Do Limpopo, and the column turned west to attack Mapai.

The assault element moved toward Mapai without incident until it reached the airfield on the "outskirts" of the city. A large force of FRELIMO and ZANLA units were well "dug in"; they were also equipped with 61mm mortars and several 14.5mm heavy machine guns. After several hours of intense combat, the ZANLA and FRELIMO forces were driven from the airfield, and a subsequent attack pushed them from the city.

On May 30, one of the unique elements of this war occurred. Until then, there had been several sharp engagements in which 32 guerrillas had been killed.¹³ This had been a good operation, but not necessarily remarkable. Upon entering Mapai, Captain Murphy had captured a vast quantity of ZANLA arms and ammunition, and his force had discovered a number of ZANLA vehicles. Captain Murphy requested and received Dakota aircraft at the Mapai air-field to return the arms and ammunition to Rhodesia. The aircraft also brought several teams of mechanics and drivers trained and equipped for the specific mission of repairing and returning the captured ZANLA/Soviet vehicles to Rhodesia.

At 2000, May 30, the last Dakota was leaving the Mapai air-field when it was struck with an RPG-7 rocket. The passengers and most of the crew survived the crash. At first light, on May 31, an air force salvage team flew to the airfield by helicopter, and retrieved every piece of serviceable equipment prior to the final destruction of the plane. The retrieval of this equipment was considered such a high priority that the entire combat operation halted until this mission had been completed.

On May 31, the column returned to Jorge Do Limpopo. At this point, Murphy was told to prepare for withdrawal because of the international pressure being placed on Rhodesia by the United States and the Republic of South Africa. Although the military was told to anticipate this order, it had not yet been given, hence the column commander was ordered to move an additional 20 kilometers south of Jorge Do Limpopo and destroy as much of the railway as possible within the limitations of that distance.

Captain Murphy turned south, but disregarded the restrictions on his movement. He moved to Mabalane which was 200 kilometers from Jorge Do Limpopo. During his movement, he destroyed a number of railroad bridges and stations. Upon reaching Mabalane, he discovered the only railway steam crane in Mozambique. His unit destroyed it. It is interesting that this crane was replaced in a matter of months by the Republic of South Africa. The column turned north, and moved through light resistance toward the Rhodesian border. The operation ended on June 2, 1977.

The final evaluation of this operation was summarized by Lt.Col. Daly:

The total kills achieved on the (operation) was never accurately ascertained, but even the minimum figures were in excess of 60. The major achievements had not been kills... it had been the final elimination of the Mozambique railway in the Gaza Province along which the ZANLA terrorists, their equipment and stores had been moving to the Rhodesian border,

the destruction or capture of a large number of military vehicles being used for the same purposes, and the capture of a vast quantity of terrorists' war material. ¹⁴

OPERATION VODKA: DECEMBER 1978

1978 has been called the "Beginning of the End" for the white minority government of Rhodesia. By June, Military Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Organization had completed a study which documented that the kill ratio inside Rhodesia was significantly less than the level of infiltration. Rhodesia was being over-run by nationalist insurgents.¹⁵ The Rhodesian Army had spread itself too thin and had become ineffective. As a result, several new policies were instituted. The country was reduced to vital areas. These areas included the most productive agricultural lands, the industrial centers, and the lines of communication with the Republic of South Africa. The remaining portion of the country would be ceded to the insurgents, and swept by the armed forces on occasion. This was a pragmatic decision, based upon the fact that the civil administration in the abandoned areas had already "broken down."

The territorial units and the Rhodesian African Rifles would be responsible for operations within these areas. The Rhodesian Light Infantry, SAS, and Selous Scouts would continue operations in the newly established "Insurgent Liberated Areas," and continue their raids into the Front-Line border states.¹⁶

Within the parameters of this new policy, Operation VODKA commenced. This attack was directed against Joshua Nkomo's ZIPRA forces in Zambia. Until this point, Nkomo's military objectives had remained obscure. It was felt that he was purposefully allowing Mugabe's forces to do the majority of fighting while holding his own in reserve and building his strength. When the ZANLA operations had sufficiently "worn down" the Rhodesian forces, and its own strength was diminished, Nkomo would strike. He hoped to mount a conventional invasion of Rhodesia from Zambia with the assistance of Cuban troops and East German advisors.

As the focus of the war turned to Zambia, it became known that a ZIPRA camp had been established approximately 140 kilometers north of the traditional Rhodesian border at Mboroma, Zambia. This camp held a special interest because it was identified as a ZIPRA prison compound. Rhodesian Intelligence had confirmed that members of the Rhodesian Security Forces and ZIPRA dissidents were held in this area. The Rhodesians were anxious to free their countrymen and have the additional advantage of gaining a great deal of information from the liberated dissidents.

The Selous Scouts, whose strength now numbered approximately 1000 men, were assigned the responsibility for this raid. The attack would be synchronized with an air strike on the town of Mulungushi, and an SAS assault elsewhere in Zambia as a diversionary action. Throughout the early days of December, reconnaissance elements had confirmed 120 prisoners within a fenced camp, and approximately 50 ZIPRA guards. The insurgents were very conscious of air activity, and had fired upon several Zambian aircraft which had flown over the compound. The guerrillas were well "dug in," and armed with several Soviet 14.5mm anti-aircraft guns.

On December 22, an air strike attacked the ZIPRA barracks and non-prisoner installations. Immediately following the air-strike, a company size element of Selous Scouts made an airborne assault on the camp. Upon consolidation, the Scouts seized the camp while killing 18 ZIPRA insurgents. During the initial sweep of the compound, only 32 prisoners were located. While these men were being processed, the search teams began to prepare to detonate several underground storage chambers. As they set their explosives, the recently liberated prisoners told them to stop.

When these chambers were examined, the Rhodesians found underground detention cells. As the soldiers assisted men from their cells, it was obvious that some of them had not seen sunlight in months. They were covered with their own faeces, suffered from rat and insect bites, and were malnourished to the point of starvation.

Many of these men had been members of the Rhodesian Army who had been kidnapped from their home villages while on leave. A number of the dissidents were young men who were offered educational scholarships for higher studies in Botswana. Once they entered Botswana, they were marched to Zambia and worked in the ZIPRA Publicity Department. At this point, they were evaluated. The zealots entered the ZIPRA forces while those who remained reluctant were sent to Mboroma for re-education.

While this operation served as an emotional victory over insurgent forces, it also marked the beginning of a concentrated effort of the Rhodesian forces against Nkomo's ZIPRA insurgents, and the involvement of Zambia in the final year of the war.¹⁷

OPERATION ASSASSINATION: APRIL 1979

As the pressure of the war continued to turn against Rhodesia, desperate plans were introduced. The country had held free elections, and Bishop Abel Muzorewa was elected Prime Minister of the newly formed State of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The international community refused to recognize its legitimacy because neither Robert Mugabe nor Joshua Nkomo were participants in the elections. Bishop Muzorewa immediately declared an amnesty for all insurgents who surrendered to the government forces. His offer failed. As the new government began to form a policy for the continuation of the war, two dramatic incidents occurred which served as the final catalyst for the initiation of assassination orders. On February 9, a commercial Air Rhodesia Viscount was climbing to altitude after taking off from the resort town of Kariba in northern Rhodesia. It was struck by a Soviet SAM-7 missile. The civilian aircraft was carrying 54 passengers. The plane crashed with 18 survivors. The ZIPRA insurgents who had fired the missile proceeded to kill 10 of the 18 surviving passengers.¹⁸ Within a short span of time, ZIPRA guerrillas downed a second Viscount. Joshua Nkomo claimed responsibility during a radio broadcast "and horrified white Rhodesians heard him chuckle over the slaughter."¹⁹

The mission for the assassination of Nkomo was given to the SAS. A force of 25 men began preparations in early April on an isolated peninsula on Lake Kariba. The raid was to be conducted with the use of 7 Land Rovers painted in a Zambian camouflage pattern, and manned by the raid element dressed in Zambian Army uniforms.

On April 14, a radio message from the capital of Zambia, Lusaka, confirmed that Nkomo had returned to his residence. The operation commenced, the convoy was ferried across Lake Kariba, and landed on a remote beach in Zambia. Reconnaissance flights had photographed a road through the "bush" which would bypass most of the Zambian Army check points along the main highway leading to Lusaka from the Rhodesian border. The road was almost impassable, and one of the vehicles had to be abandoned. When the column reached the main highway, it was approximately two hours behind schedule. The principle concern throughout the entire operation was the crossing of the bridge which traversed the Kafue River along the Lusaka road. The bridge was reported to be protected by two Zambian Army units stationed on either side. They were well equipped, and possessed Soviet anti-aircraft guns. As the Rhodesian force approached the bridge, they found it was manned by a lone sentry who waved them through his check point without incident.

At 0240, the column entered Lusaka and moved through the capital to Nkomo's home, the Zimbabwe House. This residence had been the former Zambian Prime Minister's home. It was located across the street from the residence of the British High Commission, and within several hundred meters of the State House, the home of President Kenneth Kaunda. The lead vehicle crashed through the iron gate of the fence surrounding Nkomo's home. An intense fire fight began, and the insurgents proved to be well trained and disciplined fighters. The SAS was armed with a number of Soviet RPG rockets, and this weapon served as the decisive factor. The insurgents withdrew. As the SAS began to search the wreckage, they realized that Nkomo was not amongst the dead or wounded.

The Nkomo strike force withdrew, and moved to the Liberty House, which was the ZIPRA headquarters building in Zambia. Upon entering Lusaka, a team had struck the ZIPRA Headquarters as a secondary mission. The entire column consolidated at this point.

After the destruction of the building, at approximately 0500 the force withdrew from Lusaka with only three casualties. The convoy crossed the Kafue Bridge, and moved to a rendezvous point on Lake Kariba while avoiding Zambian spotter planes. Fortunately, the Zambian government believed that the raid force had been parachuted into the country near Lusaka and obtained the vehicles on the ground. The Zambian Army concentrated its efforts in the capital by establishing road blocks and questioning the European population.

Joshua Nkomo claimed to be present in his residence when the attack commenced, and escaped via a window in the rear of his home. The raiding party disputed his claim by asserting "that no one left the building alive after the attack had begun."²⁰

OPERATION DICE: (NKOMO'S PLAN FOR A CONVENTIONAL INVASION OF RHODESIA): 1979-1980

Throughout the Rhodesian War, Nkomo had received considerable aid from the Soviet Union and East Germany. This assistance included a number of advisors to his War Council which was located at his Military Headquarters, the Liberty House, in Lusaka. These advisors were primarily Cuban and Soviet military officers who were attached to their respective embassies.

During the early months of 1979, the insurgents were convinced that they would emerge as the victors in their war against Muzorewa's coalition government. The tenuous bonds of the Patriotic Front began to dissolve as Nkomo and Mugabe focused their plans upon their attempts to consolidate their own power within Rhodesia in order to seize control of the government once an insurgent victory was achieved.

The Soviet Union began to increase its assistance to Nkomo in order to ensure his control of Zimbabwe, and to enhance their sphere of influence with southern Africa. Nkomo and his Soviet sponsors became concerned over their lack of influence throughout the black population of Rhodesia in contrast to Mugabe's ever increasing popularity, and his recognition as Muzorewa's most probable successor. In order to counter ZANLA's influence, the Soviet and Cuban advisors to the War Council provided a complete revision to the ZIPRA Order of Battle within Rhodesia, and its long term military objectives. This revision outlined the necessity of developing a conventional ZIPRA Army while using its guerrilla forces to open the way for a full scale invasion of Rhodesia.

The plan was based upon the training and equipping of at least five battalions of ZIPRA soldiers which were task-organized following the model of Soviet Motorized Infantry Battalions. It was estimated that this would be the minimum force required to defeat both the Rhodesian Security Forces and Mugabe's ZANLA insurgents. The scheme of maneuver involved an assault along two axis of advance across the Zambezi River. The first was along the northeast border to seize the airfield at Kariba while the second would occur at Victoria Falls in order to capture the airfield at Wankie. Once this had been achieved Libyan transport aircraft would airlift those remaining ZIPRA forces in Angola and Zambia into Rhodesia. MIG 17, 19, and 21's would be provided for air-support, and manned by ZIPRA pilots. It was assumed that additional aircraft would be manned by Cuban and Libyan volunteers if they were required. The capital city of Salisbury remained the principle objective. Once the bridgehead was established at Wankie and Kariba, three armored columns would speed toward the capital. The first would move directly from Kariba. The second would attack from Wankie via the city of Que Oue. The third element would move from Wankie to Kariba in order to consolidate the northern frontier, and then advance toward Salisbury. The second largest city in Rhodesia, Bulawayo, was by-passed because it was in Matabeleland, which was Nkomo's homeland and base of power.

In order to achieve these ambitious objectives, the Soviets took charge of training the ZIPRA conventional forces. Two training areas were established. The first was at the former Zambian Army Barracks at Mulungushi, and the second at the Boma camp in Luso, Angola. As the emphasis of the war became focused upon Nkomo's conventional forces, his ZIPRA insurgents in Rhodesia were confronted by two serious problems which manifested themselves into a single element - ZANLA. The ZIPRA guerrillas in southern Matabeleland were confronted by ZANLA soldiers who were pushing as far into Rhodesia as possible in order to consolidate ZANU power.

Nkomo's unconventional forces were required to wage war on a dual front against the Rhodesian Security Forces, and the encroaching elements of the ZANLA insurgents. To add to this dilemma, both of these components were much better equipped than the ZIPRA guerrilla.

Nkomo had made the decision to use the majority of his Soviet supplies to equip his conventional force. As a result, the ZIPRA insurgents began to express their resentment against their role as an ill-equipped force facing the enemy while their conventional counterparts enjoyed the security of Zambia. The result was large scale desertions as the disenchanted Matabele tribesmen returned to their villages.

Once Nkomo realized the seriousness of the situation, he began to commit his conventional force. This should have made a dramatic impact, but it did not. Nkomo had made the decision to allow his principle guerrilla commanders in the various insurgent regions to exercise operational control over the regular forces. This was a serious mistake. These leaders demonstrated their resentment of the newly arrived forces by splitting their unit integrity and using them as replacements to existing guerrilla elements. Into the midst of this situation moved the Rhodesian Security Forces, intent upon using every ZIPRA problem to their advantage.

ZIPRA was being trained by the Soviets on their usual rigid pattern and probably, to them anyway, any area of African bush seemed to a degree mysterious and easy to move through without detection... even though this view certainly wasn't held either by the ZIPRA personnel or by the Rhodesians. The consequences were that ZIPRA regulars, on Soviet orders, infiltrated at set crossing points, and the culling of their numbers by the Security Forces became a daily almost boring routine. Generally, because of their lack of subtlety and, provided one is willing to accept the evidence of one's eyes at face value, there is nothing particularly mysterious about Soviet tactics which are rigidly bolted to their strategies...both are one and the same, in fact, as they try to control tactics from the top, giving the man in the field little flexibility.²¹

In addition to his ZIPRA regular forces, Nkomo had approximately 300 South African - African National Congress Insurgents. They had trained and lived with the ZIPRA guerrillas since the early 1970's in preparation for carrying the war of liberation to the Republic of South Africa. During this period, they had entered Rhodesia and were committed to the ZIPRA operational area surrounding the city of Gwanda. Their primary mission was to assist Nkomo's forces in halting the ZANLA advance into Matabeleland. At the end of the Rhodesian War, these forces were reconstituted, and were preparing to continue their mission in the Republic of South Africa. At this point, the British peace-keeping force that had been introduced into Zimbabwe to oversee the general elections, intervened and caused the return of this element via RAF transport aircraft to Zambia. To the British government's credit, it did not allow an insurgent base to develop in Zimbabwe under its protection.

By the summer of 1979, Nkomo's conventional forces began to mass at a complex identified as CGT-2 Camp. Rhodesian intelligence estimated that approximately 20,000 men were being assembled. It was confirmed that MIG fighters had arrived in Zambia, and the armored vehicles which were to be supplied to ZIPRA forces via the Zambian Army began to appear. Joshua Nkomo received an additional impetus from the Lancaster House Peace Talks. If these talks produced a settlement, he would need as many of his forces in Zimbabwe as possible in order to achieve majority status in Nkomo's traditional tribal area.

The Rhodesian Security Forces were being assaulted from all sides. The elected officials under Muzorewa's government were beginning to prepare for the insurgent assumption of power. No one wanted to be associated with the element of the white minority government which had caused the guerrillas so much pain throughout their struggle. Yet the military remained the single cohesive element of power within this fragile nation. Although the government was headed by a black Prime Minister, the Rhodesian Security Force remained an instrument of the white minority. It realized that it was incapable of halting a full scale invasion of its country by ZIPRA forces, but it could delay such an advance long enough to persuade Nkomo to accept the conditions of the Lancaster House Settlement in lieu of an invasion; if this occurred a peaceful transition of power under British supervision would result.

The Security Force developed a strategy which would delay ZIPRA's use of its mechanized assets as the basis for its invasion. The SAS, Selous Scouts, and the Rhodesian Light Infantry were tasked with the destruction of the major bridges along the main Zambian lines of communication leading to the Rhodesian border. This was accomplished with surgical precision under the guidance of the SAS. They had already destroyed the road and rail bridges along the major thoroughfare which linked Zambia to Tanzania. This had a major impact upon the Zambian economy because this route served as the primary means of import/export exchange with the international community. In a period of approximately three weeks, the SAS directed the destruction of 8 additional road and railway bridges in Zambia. This action crippled Nkomo's forces, while virtually halting all Zambian trade in the international market.²²

The SAS is credited with accomplishing Rhodesia's final military objective. Nkomo was forced to reconsider his participation in the Lancaster Settlement; thus an "all party" agreement was signed on December 17, 1979. On December 12, Lord Christopher Soames entered Salisbury as the British Governor and officially returned the country to a colonial status. Great Britain's dominion ensured the peaceful transition of power through free elections held between February 14-18, 1980. As a result of this vote, Robert Mugabe was elected Prime Minister, and the nation state of Zimbabwe was born. Further details are described in Chapter II.

SUMMARY

COMPARISON WITH BRITISH ACTIONS IN MALAYA (1947-1962)

Throughout the research for this project, we found that many of the Rhodesian sources made analogous comparisons between their struggle with the Patriotic Front and Britain's problems in Malaya from 1947-1962. The foundation of these comparisons were based upon two facts. The first, that Britain had developed an effective counterinsurgency program in Malaya and the successful elements of this concept could be used in Rhodesia. The second, that members of the Rhodesian security forces had fought in Malaya and were experienced in this type of warfare. We will examine these hypotheses.

In the early 1950's, the campaign in Malaya was going badly for the commonwealth forces. The British were fighting in a conventional fashion with modifications for jungle warfare. Their primary tactic appeared to be centered upon patrolling from one rubber plantation to another along the fringe of the jungle. There were very few contacts with the insurgents. The local police and government officials remained the guerrillas' prime targets, and they suffered heavy casualties. The insurgents appeared to move throughout the country at random without concern for the British presence. As a result, the British crown commissioned a recently retired General, Sir Henry Briggs to serve as Director of Operations in Malaya.

The fifty-five-year old Briggs introduced a new operational concept. The Briggs' Plan...recognized that the key to the situation lay in winning support of the civil population or at least depriving guerrillas of that support. So long as guerrillas controlled large segments of the Chinese "squatter" population, police and troops would be deprived of intelligence concerning Communist village infrastructure and guerrilla movements;

conversely, guerrillas would continue to receive intelligence regarding police and military movements. How to prevent this? Briggs answered this question with an imaginative resettlement plan that called for rounding up and moving almost 500,000 people into 400 newly constructed villages. Like earlier segregation schemes that concentrated people in camps such as those the British introduced in the Boer War, the Briggs' Plan aimed at collapsing the insurgency by depriving guerrillas of civil support.²³

General Briggs also realized the need for a unified headquarters. He introduced a War Council of civil, police, and military representatives. It was not a command element. It was a Joint planning and coordinating committee which was responsible to the unified commander.²⁴ As these programs were being instituted, the British activated the Special Air Service Regiment which consisted of three squadrons. Two were formed in England, with one consisting of Rhodesian volunteers.²⁵ The unit was to be used in the third phase of the Briggs Plan: the ability to carry the war to the insurgents in his jungle strong points.

In a further attempt to stabilize the Malayan situation, the British government created a new post of Supreme Commander. They selected General Gerald Templar for this position, and provided him with extraordinary powers.

Templar, who had quickly realized the war could not be won by military means alone, drew the civil administration into the planning phases, ensuring finally that the political, military, and civil administrations dovetailed neatly into his place for them in the common strategy to defeat the enemy.²⁶

The Rhodesians attempted to adapt these policies to their own insurgency, but without a great deal of success. The concept of the Protected Village worked in Malaya, but was a dismal failure in Rhodesia. The reason remains that Malaya was unique while the failure of this policy in the Boer and Vietnam Wars should serve as the standard. Although, when instituted in South Africa, the policy was a moderate strategic success, it so thoroughly antagonized the indigenous population that Britain eventually lost control of the colony, and it is still remembered in the Republic of South Africa with a great deal of negative emotion. The key difference between the use of this concept in Malaya versus Rhodesia, Vietnam, and South Africa is found within the classification of indigenous population. The British had attempted to introduce a new political arrangement on the Malayan Peninsula known as the Union of Malaya. This was an effort to provide a balanced system of political power between the minority Chinese and Indian ethnic groups against the majority Malay population. It failed because of the well entrenched Malayan bureaucracy.²⁷

The insurgent war in Malaya was waged by the Chinese minority. When the protected villages were established, the majority of people who were moved belonged to the Chinese minority. The Malays were relatively untouched by the resettlement, and were quite pleased to have the Chinese put to the inconvenience. In Rhodesia, this concept was introduced into an environment in which the indigenous population consisted of two major tribes. Although their tribal differences were pronounced, their racial commonalities served as the focal point for their opposition to the program. The majority of the population in Rhodesia resisted the concept.

The Rhodesians had a great deal of difficulty in instituting the concept of a Supreme Commander. Because of the unusual degree of influence that the BSAP exercised, it was reluctant to relinquish any of its power or authority to the Security Force. A compromise plan was established in the form of the Joint Operation Center. It was an unsatisfactory system. It was war by consensus. Each nomination for a Supreme commander would fail due to inter-service and inter-agency rivalry.

So the arguments about the Supreme system... continued as the war escalated. The nominations for the position were always there... and always in triplicate. The Police and

Army... considered... an Air Force Supremo as untenable, the Police considered the appointment of an Army Supremo as unthinkable, while the Army and the Air Force jointly considered the appointment of a Police Supremo as unspeakable...the government, outwardly stern and confident, vacillated and fidgetted nervously beneath the comforting cover of a blanket of censorship. In the case of the appointment of a Supremo it would have become a tacit admission that the terrorist insurgency... had actually blossomed into a full scale war... It also crossed their minds, so it was said, that if they built up the authority of the Security Forces so there was a commander perched on the top of one great pyramid... they might, if they continued to approach the war in their current fashion, find themselves removed from office...in a military coup d'etat.²⁸

It was not until 24 March, 1977 that the Rhodesian government appointed General Peter Walls, Rhodesian Army, to the post of Supreme Commander, Rhodesian Security Forces.

EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER INSURGENCY WARFARE

In January 1983, Lieutenant Colonel P.A.C. HOWGILL, Royal Marine Commandos, provided the Command and Staff College with nine principles which should be adhered to while conducting a counterinsurgency campaign. Although the text of his class was directed toward the British involvement in Northern Ireland, the principles have a universal adaptability. These principles will be discussed in relation to their use during the Rhodesian War.

1.REQUIREMENT FOR GOOD INTELLIGENCE: The Rhodesians generally received high marks in this area. Their collection agencies were divided into three groups - The Central Intelligence Organization, Military Intelligence, and the Special Branch of the BSAP. Although some rivalry existed, the Security Force received timely and good intelligence. The majority of their collection means involved prisoner interrogation, aerial photography, and ground reconnaissance missions. Once the Supreme Commander established unity of command with the Headquarters for Combined Operations, the dissemination of this material became much more efficient.

2.CO-LOCATION OF MILITARY AND POLICE HEADQUARTERS, AND AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY: The Rhodesian government had recognized the necessity of this from the early days of the war. When they implemented the concept, they failed to include its most important ingredient. The necessity to ensure unity of command. As has been discussed, this was not accomplished until 1977.

3. THE USE OF MINIMUM FORCE TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION: This was the Rhodesians' finest trait. They had the ability to gather the facts, plan a mission, organize a task force, and strike. Much of this was driven by the nature of the war and their lack of sophisticated equipment. Yet they had developed a unique capacity to examine a situation, and tailor a force to counter or eliminate its threat.

4.ADEQUATE MOBILE RESERVES: They utilized the American doctrine of a helicopter-borne reserve element (SPARROW HAWK) which was developed in the Republic of Vietnam. Due to their inability to obtain parts and equipment, this reserve was used in a sparing fashion. Their assault elements developed the mentality that the reserve would only be committed as an absolute last resort.

5.ADEQUATE TRAINING: The Rhodesian soldier was a much more well trained fighter than his European counterpart. He was driven by the knowledge that the enemy was "on his door step." Consequently, he was a much more willing participant in the training. On an average, the minimum instruction he received was 16 weeks. After being posted to an operational unit, the entire unit would "stand down" for periods of retraining. Because the European population carried the major share of the fighting, the system of national reserve training ensured that the soldier stayed proficient in his skills.

6.GOOD COMMUNICATIONS: Although the Security Forces never enjoyed the advantage of satellite communications, they developed an effective system of tactical and strategic communications utilizing British, American, South African, and Israeli equipment.

7.PUBLIC RELATIONS: Rhodesia was an international outlaw. It was a nation attempting to justify a system which had been by-passed by the 20th century. The advantage of modern communications brought this war to the forefront of international attention. When the British crushed the Malayan Insurgency, it was during a period when the world still accepted the vestiges of imperial dominion. Rhodesia attempted to prolong this status in an era and a geographic location dominated by the people who had shouldered the burden of colonialism for centuries. They made a good attempt to justify their existence, but it was doomed from the beginning.

8.ESTABLISHED TACTICAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY: The Security Forces recognized the necessity of this principle, but they were unable to utilize it because of their lack of strength. As the insurgents increased in numbers, the Rhodesians were forced to accept a defensive posture. They exercised the ability to strike at the enemy in force, but they were unable to control the terrain.

9.CONTINUITY: Because of the size of the Security Force, continuity was a major advantage. The members were familiar with one another, and able to communicate in a very efficient fashion. The National Reserve System also helped to ensure the continuity of the force.

Although the Rhodesian government and its Security Force were basically successful in their adherence to these principles, they were simply unable to resist the flow of the 20th century.

A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTERVIEWS AND ORAL PRESENTATIONS

Howgil, P.A.C. "Counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland." Presentation to USMC C&SC class, Jan 18, 1983. During Lt.Col. Howgil's presentation to the class he outlined nine principles of counterinsurgency warfare used by the British Royal Marines. Although the terrain and character of conflict in Northern Ireland and Rhodesia were different, it was useful to examine the performance of the Rhodesian government forces in the context of these general principles.

Melshen, Paul. Kings College, University of London, England. Mr. Melshen served in Rhodesia during 1978-1979. He was not a member of the regular Rhodesian Security Forces, but served as a para-military officer employed by White farmers to augment their security. He left the country shortly prior to the ZAPU/ZANU victory. In addition to this interview, an unpublished paper by Mr. Melshen is cited in the secondary sources.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Asprey, Robert B. War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History. Vol I and II. New York: Doubleday, 1975. Mr. Asprey, a well-known military historian, is also the author of Semper Fidelis. This book is an in-depth study of guerrilla forces throughout history, and provides one of the finest discussions of the Commonwealth efforts in Malaya available. This was a major help in comparing Rhodesia with other counterinsurgency operations.

Blackman, M.L.M. Fighting forces of Rhodesia. Rhodesia: Central African Publications, 1978. Published by the Rhodesian Security Forces, this book's primary value is the outline it provides for the structure, description and training of the Security Forces, BSAP and INTAF. It also offers interesting insights into the feelings of white Rhodesians during the peak war years.

Blake, Robert. A history of Rhodesia. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978. A balanced history of

the country. Thoroughly researched and documented. Strongly recommended as background reading on the subject.

"The Boys in the Bush," Time. Dec 31, 1979. A description of ZAPU and ZANU forces in vignette form. Some leaders are mentioned, and the upcoming elections of 1980 are discussed.

Brown, Robert K. "The Black Devils," Soldier of Fortune (Jan 1979). Although this magazine has a tendency to sensationalize, on occasion, this particular article offered valuable insights into the war. Mr. Brown, publisher of SOF, spent several weeks with the Rhodesian Armored Car Regiment (The Black Devils) and provides the finest description available of their tactics, equipment and philosophy.

Bruton, James K. "Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia." The Military Review (Mar 1979) Captain Bruton, a captain in the USAR, travelled to Rhodesia in 1978-79 to study the organization and tactics of the RSF. A well-balanced, carefully researched article.

"Caught in the Middle," Time (Sept 12, 1977) p. 25. A good description of the classic fate of peasants caught in a guerrilla struggle. Support for either side results in retribution by the other.

Conn, Barry. "The War in Rhodesia: A Dissenter's View." African Affairs (Oct 1977). An excellent source of information. The title is misleading. Cohen wrote the article after interviewing a former Rhodesian soldier. Although the soldier did not support the Smith government, he was able to separate his political views from his military experiences. The article provides an insight into the normal routine and feelings of the average soldier.

"Cornered," The Economist (Sept 16, 1978). A short article which details Smith's reaction to Nkomo's admission of shooting down an Air Rhodesian civilian plane. Smith's response was seen as inadequate.

Daly, Ronald R. Selous Scouts. South Africa: Galago Publishing, 1982. Absolutely the finest and most current information concerning the Rhodesian War. Daly was the Commanding Officer of the Selous Scouts, the most elite force in the RSF. The book discusses the major battles of the war, and provides an excellent summary of many classified events surrounding the war effort. Daly offers an excellent insight into the training, equipment, motivation and movement of guerrilla forces.

Daniels, George M. Drums of War New York: Joseph Okpaku Publishing Co., 1974. The author is affiliated with the United Methodist Board of Global Ministries. The book is a collection of articles supportive of the nationalist cause. Unabashedly one-sided, it is a plea for U.S. sanctions against the government of Rhodesia.

Gann, L.H. "Prospects for White Resistance" African Report (Sep-Oct 1977), pp. 9-14. Dr. Gann is author, co-author, or co-editor of 13 published works on colonialism, European settlement in Africa, and related questions. This article is a well-balanced evaluation of the Rhodesian conflict through 1977. The author predicts that the White government will not be overthrown.

Hall, Richard. "Black victory in Rhodesia: How Bloody Will It Be?" New York Times (July 11, 1976) Sec 6, pp. 13-34. Hall, a member of the staff of the Financial Times of London, spent 13 years reporting from central Africa. This effort is a good description of major guerrilla leaders, and a comparison of this insurgency with that in Kenya and Algeria.

Hodges, Tony. "Counterinsurgency and the Fate of Rural Blacks." African Reports. (Sept-Oct 1977). This article provides an excellent review of the protected village concept which was instituted in Rhodesia in 1973. The African Report was a "pro-nationalist" publication, and this philosophy is reflected in the article.

Jaynes, Gregory. "Rhodesia's Resolute Leader" New York Times (Mar 5, 1980), p. 8. An

interview with Robert Mugabe on the occasion of his victory in the Rhodesian elections at the conclusion of the guerrilla war. No more remarkable than most post-election interviews.

“To the Jugular,” The Economist (Apr 24, 1976). The article describes very early in the war the Achilles heel of the RSF-manpower. Well-written, it was one of the earliest to highlight the problem.

Kapungu, Leonard T. Rhodesia: The Struggle for Freedom, Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1974. A book written by a Black native of Zimbabwe. Dr Kapungu presents the African point of view in a somewhat emotional, but sincere manner. He predicts that a change to majority rule in the country would come about only as a result of armed rebellion.

Kaufman, Michael T. “Turning Point Seen Ahead for Rhodesia by a Black leader,” New York Times (Sep 26, 1976), p. 1. A rather uninformative interview with Joshua Nkomo. Of no value to this study.

Keegan, John. World Armies. New York: Facts on File, 1979. Primarily a capsulized reference source. Mr. Keegan’s discussion of Rhodesia was excellent. It was published in the last year of the Rhodesian War, and contains the most current statistics concerning the RSF. The author’s military background and his association with Sandhurst lends credibility to his writings and conclusions.

Kirk, Tony “Politics and Violence in Rhodesia,” African Report(Jan 1975), pp. 3-38. .Best description available on the emergence of the FROLIZI splinter group. Very well researched and written.

Legum, Colin. “The Devil Himself” The New Republican (Dec 17, 1977). Mr. Legum is an associate-editor of “The Observer.” He was a critic of the Rhodesian War and Smith’s government. The author claims that the majority of the 1200 casualties in the Chimaro Raid were women and children.

Melshen, Paul. “ZANLA’S War in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia: A look at Strategy and Tactics,” (Unpublished Paper). The author’s background is described in section one of the bibliography. This paper is particularly valuable for tactical insights into guerrilla operations.

Moore, Robin. Rhodesia New York: Condor Publishing Company, 1977. Robin Moore is the author of The Green Berets, The French Connection and The Washington Connection. A rather controversial character, he lived in Salisbury in 1976-77, where he proclaimed himself as the “American Ambassador” to Rhodesia (self-appointed). His book is highly biased, and borders on racial slander.

Nelson, Howard D. et. al. Area Handbook for Southern Rhodesia 1st ed. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. Prepared by the Foreign Area Studies of the American University, it is a useful source of data on such subjects as climate, topography, politics and racial makeup of Rhodesia.

Raeburn, Michael. We Are Everywhere (New York: Random House, 1979). The best book available for a description of life as a guerrilla. The author spent considerable time with the forces of both ZAPU and ZANU.

“Rhodesia,” Deadline Data on World Affairs (Oct 1, 1979). This reference consists of a review of newspaper articles concerning significant events in a particular country in chronological order. Each event has a capsulized summary, as well as its source. A good place to start research.

”Rhodesian Airliner Shot Down by Guerrillas,” The New York Times (Sep 5, 1978), p. 1. A description of the first of two incidents when ZAPU guerrillas shot down an Air Rhodesia airliner with SAM missiles.

Robinson, Donald. The Dirty Wars. New York: Delacorte Press, 1968. This book is a collection of short stories concerning individual soldiers in combat during the 1950's and 1960's. Although interesting, the book is of limited value for a study of Rhodesia.

Ross, Jay. "Zimbabwean Whites Assail Breakdown of Law, Order" The Washington Post (Sept 19, 1982), p. A26. The author, a correspondent for the Post, has written articles in Rhodesia for the last decade. This is an update on Rhodesia's internal problems describing the continuing friction between ZAPU and ZANU elements.

"A Siding Near the Road's End," The Economist (Dec 3, 1977) pp. 85-86. A description of the status of ZIPRA and ZANLA forces during this period of time. The article predicts that Smith's government will eventually fall.

"Smith Takes a Dangerous New Gamble," Time (Jan 13, 1977) The article outlines the events surrounding Operation Aztec without mentioning the operation by name. It is valuable because it balances the official report of the action found in Daly's Selous Scouts, emphasizing that "only" 32 insurgents were killed and few weapons captured.

"Sneak Attack," Time (Apr 23, 1979) p. 37. An excellent description of Nkomo's narrow escape from a Rhodesian assassination attempt at his home in Lusaka, Zambia.

Steele, Richard. "White Africa at Bay" Newsweek (June 7, 1976) pp. 31-39. An interesting article, accompanied by an excellent map, which describes the status of Rhodesia and South Africa in mid-1976. Offers some examples of war in the bush, and describes the role of Black African leaders in the crisis.

"We Are Going Home," Time (Dec 31, 1979) pp. 32-33. Description of events as major guerrilla leaders agree to a cease-fire and prepare for elections. Highlights the problems as ZAPU and ZANU maneuver for position.

"ZIPRA Up," The Economist (July 3, 1976) p. 53. A description of the rivalries between the various guerrillas. The only periodical to accurately predict, in 1976, Mugabe's rise to power.

1 Lt.Col. Ronald Reid Daly, Selous Scouts (Republic of South Africa: Galago Publishing, 1982), pp. 147—151.

2 Daly, Selous, pp. 169-178.

3 Daly, Selous, p. 205.

4 Daly, Selous, p. 206.

5 Daly, Selous, p. 206.

6 Daly, Selous, p. 212.

7 "Rhodesians Cross Mozambique Border," New York Times, 25 August 1976.

8 "Rhodesians Offer Proof Mozambique Camp was Guerrilla Stronghold," New York Times, 27 August 1976.

9 Daly, Selous, p. 221.

10 Daly, Selous, p. 274.

- [11](#) “Attacks Against Mozambique,” Washington Post, 7 June 1977.
- [12](#) Daly, Selous, p. 275.
- [13](#) Washington Post, 7 June 1977.
- [14](#) Daly, Selous, p. 280.
- [15](#) “Appeal Made to Britian and US,” Washington Post, 16 June 1978.
- [16](#) Daly, Selous, p. 331.
- [17](#) Daly, Selous, pp. 331-336.
- [18](#) “Airline Massacre,” The Financial Times, London, 5 September 1978.
- [19](#) George Gordon, “Operation Assassination,” Soldier of Fortune, October 1980, p. 30.
- [20](#) Gordon, Assassination, pp. 30-32.
- [21](#) Daly, Selous, p. 409.
- [22](#) Daly, Selous, pp. 404-420.
- [23](#) Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows, (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1975), Vol. 11, p. 788.
- [24](#) Asprey, Shadows, p. 789.
- [25](#) Daly, Selous, p. 260.
- [26](#) Daly, Selous, p. 261.
- [27](#) Asprey, Shadows, p. 782.
- [28](#) Daly, Selous, p. 263.

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| War Since 1945, Seminar: Chapter 1 | Online Book Project - Main | Rhodesia: Military History |
|--|--|--|